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Turkey‘s foreign policy has been drawing considerable attention 
particularly because of the momentous transformations in the Middle 
East. The visits of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuoglu to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in 
September 2011 and their subsequent visits to the region underscored the 
rise of Turkey‘s involvement in the region. The Arab Spring came at a 
time when Turkey‘s relations with the United States, Israel and the 
European Union were going through significant turbulence. 2010 proved 
to be a particularly difficult year for Turkey‘s place in the transatlantic 
community. The Gaza flotilla crisis in June 2010 — ending with Israeli 
forces killing eight Turkish citizens — and Turkey‘s ―no‖ vote to a new 
round of sanctions against Iran at the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council that same month triggered a heated debate on Turkey‘s relations 
with the West, which led popular American columnists such as Tom 
Friedman to go as far as arguing that Ankara was now joining the 
―Hamas- Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel.‖ While this was a 
clear exaggeration, it indicated the scope of debate on the eve of the Arab 
Spring. Since the Arab Spring, the Western discourse about Turkey has 
dramatically changed. Instead of asking ―who lost Turkey‖ or 
complaining about the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy, analysts 
began discussing whether the new regimes in the Arab world would 
follow the ―Turkish model.‖ This article aims to analyze the Turkish 
approach to the Middle East and the Arab revolutions, the main 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy in the Middle East 
and the debate on ―Turkish Model. What has changed, or has not, during 
and after the Arab Spring?   
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Legacy: A Periodization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East 
In order to locate Turkey‘s diplomacy to the Middle East, one has 
to understand the overall change in Turkish foreign policy since 1990‘s 
(Ozkan, 2006, 157-185). The end of the Cold War led to fundamental 
changes in Turkey‘s foreign policy. Ankara began to exert influence in 
Central Asia, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the 
Balkans. This was a major shift from Ankara‘s previous policies of non-
involvement. An important shift occurred in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in this period. During the Cold War years, 
Turkey preferred non-intervention in the Middle Eastern affairs, but this 
policy changed dramatically when Turkey assumed a central role in the 
Gulf War. The Gulf War, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
brought key changes in Turkey‘s understanding of the Middle East. 
Turkey started to be much more assertive than before in dealing with the 
region. However, the last two decades of Turkey‘s active involvement in 
the Middle East has been contradictory, if not sometimes has been 
confusing, if not contradictory. While Turkey supported the Coalition 
powers in the Gulf crisis in 1991, during the Iraqi War in 2003, Turkey 
was one of the countries that tried to stop the war. Turkey‘s unexpectedly 
fast-growing close relations with the Israel at the end of the 1990s, 
however, seems to change after 2002, given the fact that Prime Minister 
Erdogan did not visit Israel until May 2005, and did not give the Israeli 
Foreign Minister an appointment when he visited Turkey in the same 
year. Moreover, although Turkey openly threatened to go to war with 
Syria in 1998, Syrian President Bashar Asad visited Turkey in 2004, the 
first of its kind in 65 years and then Turkish President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer reciprocated this visit in April 2005. Ankara‘s overall relations 
with both countries are at worse level now. Conceptually speaking, one 
can argue that, Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East since 1990s have 
been wedged between security and coherence. However, these elements 
account for relations in general; and there have been three waves of 
activism in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East before the Arab 
spring started. Turkey‘s current reaction to the Arab revolutions can only 
be understood within this context. 
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Pro-Western Wave: 1991 Gulf War and Turgut Ozal 
Turkey‘s active involvement in the Gulf War represented a 
fundamental alteration of Turkey‘s traditional ―balanced‖ foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, a change that continued in the aftermath of the 
war (Sayari, 1992, 13). The Gulf War, therefore, represented the 
beginnings of a transformation of Turkey‘s regional policy on its 
southern and eastern borders. On 6 August 1990, Turkey closed the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline with the adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 661 that decided that all states should prevent ‗the import to 
their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq‘. 
Turkey‘s closure of the pipeline and the ending of all regular trade with 
Iraq was undoubtedly a vital element in the economic campaign against 
Saddam regime. According to Hale (1992) without Turkish cooperation 
―any effective embargo would have been quite impossible‖ (p. 684). 
Turkey‘s then-President Turgut Ozal had dominated policymaking on the 
Gulf War and its implementation since the beginning (Efegil, 2001, 156). 
As Makavsky (1999) explained, he championed an active foreign policy 
for Turkey on the crisis and indirectly criticized the basis of traditionalist 
approach of Turkey to the region. In this regard, President Ozal clearly 
stated: ―it is impossible for Turkey to pursue the hesitant, indecisive 
policy of waiting for others to make decisions first‖ (Robins, 1992, 76).  
The indirect involvement of Turkey in the Gulf War took two 
forms. First, the Turkish government gave its permission for the US to 
use the joint air bases in the southeast of the country, namely the Incirlik 
base. In so doing, Turkey remained a platform for the US attacks against 
Iraq for the rest of the conflict. Second, Turkey played a key and 
extremely important role in the war by tying down a sizeable proportion 
of the Iraqi army. The Gulf War showed that Turkey is one of the key 
actors in the Middle East. Indeed it was so even before the Gulf War 
because of the issues of water, and the Kurdish question. The Gulf War, 
however, served to reinforce the point. Most importantly, during the Gulf 
War, certain key principles of Turkey towards the Middle East were set 
aside. Of the most important one was Turkey‘s non-interference in intra-
Arab disputes and the Middle Eastern affairs (Karaosmanoglu, 2000, 
210). Not only did Turkey set aside this main principle, but also the style 
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of Turkish foreign policy towards the region was changed. The traditional 
low-key and cautious approaches were replaced by a new confident and 
high profile style. This policy as mentioned above was mainly promoted 
and championed by the Prime Minister (1983-1989) and later President 
(1989-1993) of Turkey, Turgut Ozal. Even after his death, the degree of 
activism and boldness that Ozal introduced to the Turkish foreign policy 
was strong (Ataman, 2002, 120-153). 
This change in Turkey‘s regional behavior became distinctive 
when it began holding meetings with Syria and Iran. The regular tripartite 
meetings began in November 1992 mainly to discuss major regional 
issues, particularly the situation in northern Iraq. The main issue that 
brought the three countries together was the Kurdish issue since the three 
countries have a large number of Kurds living in their territory. The 
primary fear of the tripartite states was the establishment of a Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq and its repercussions in the region by encouraging 
the Kurds in their territories to do so. Overall, the legacy of the Gulf War 
and Ozal in Turkish foreign policy is still considered as an important 
driving force behind Turkey‘s active involvement in the Middle East. As 
shown in following pages, the loss and gains resulting from the Gulf War 
became a reference point for Turkey‘s involvements in the region. For 
example, economically, Turkey lost approximately $60 billion by closing 
petrol pipeline between Turkey and Iraq. This economic loss alone has 
had an impact on Turkish policy orientation towards the Middle East as 
well as vis-à-vis the international community. 
 
The Anti-Western Wave: 1996-1997 the Refah Government and 
Necmettin Erbakan 
The election results of December 24, 1995 shook the Kemalist 
foundations of Turkey. For the first time since the establishment of the 
secular Republic of Turkey, a party having an Islamic orientation, Refah 
(Welfare) Party, won the election. Though it was not able to form a 
government alone, it secured the majority seats in the Turkish Parliament. 
In September 1996, Refah Party established a coalition government with 
the True Path Party. Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist prime 
minister of secularist Turkey. Once Refah got to power, Turkey‘s foreign 
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policy inclination towards the Middle East, in particular, and Islamic 
countries, in general, become persistent. 
Refah Party placed emphasis on the development of relations with 
Turkey‘s neighbors. In this regard, Refah Party put the improvement of 
Turkey‘s relations with its immediate neighbors Syria, Iran and Iraq on 
its list of priorities. Despite its short period in power (only 11 months), 
Refah Party was able to increase Ankara‘s relations with strong Muslim 
countries radically and even established a grouping among them, the 
Developing 8 (D-8). This has been the result of an activist foreign policy 
inclination of Turkey towards the Middle East.  The two trips abroad 
made as Prime Minister by Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, was to 
the Islamic world, where he visited nearly a dozen states, including Iran 
and Libya. Erbakan‘s major diplomatic initiative was to establish a 
grouping of the eight most populous Muslim countries. The D-8 intended 
to foster economic cooperation as well as political consultations among 
the Muslim countries (Ozkan, 2011, 112-115).  
 
The AKP Government and Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Beyond Dichotomies 
Turkish politics changed dramatically after November 2002, 
when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won enough seats in 
parliament to form a government. According to Quinn (2004) having 
created a ―political earthquake‖, it has been the first single party to rule 
Turkey alone in last 16 years. During this period, Ankara seemed 
increasingly eager to diversify its foreign policy portfolio while acting 
independently from the United States. This orientation has been 
accelerated by the Iraqi war in 2003, which created a disagreement 
between Turkey and the United States. The Iraqi issue led Turkey to look 
for alternative of complementing its relationship with the United States.  
The March 1, 2003 motion forbidding US troops from using 
Turkish territory in the war against Iraq was a historical turning point for 
Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East. The Turkish parliament 
prevented the United States from opening a northern front against Iraq on 
the justification that the international community considered the war 
illegitimate. Prior to the Iraqi war, Turkey adopted an active diplomacy to 
minimize problems with neighboring states. More specifically, Turkey 
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developed its relations significantly with Iran and Syria from commercial 
and security standpoints. These relations in connection with the Iraqi 
crises moved Turkey to convene a meeting with all countries bordering 
Iraq in order to enhance stability in the region and prevent then possible 
war. While Turkey was not able to prevent the war, its decision not to 
allow US soldiers to be deployed in southern Turkey has prolonged the 
process of the Iraqi invasion.  
After AKP‘s assuming power in November 2002, the relations 
between Turkey and Syria increased dramatically. In July 2003, Syrian 
President Mohammed Mustafa Miro became the first Syrian prime 
minister to visit Turkey in 17 years. Three agreements on health, oil and 
natural gas, and custom matters were signed during his visit to further 
enhance cooperation between the two countries. At the same time visits 
at ministerial and technical levels were intensively conducted on a 
reciprocal basis to further social and economic cooperation. As a sign of 
improving ties, Turkish companies established 12 investment projects in 
Syria in 2003, and trade between the two reached the $3 billion 
benchmark in 2010. Furthermore, the improvement of relations was 
culminated in the visit by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in January 
2004. This was the first official visit by a Syrian head of state in 57 years. 
During his visit specific measures were taken to improve relations as well 
as coordination and consultation on regional issues (Altunisik, 2004, 
369). 
From 2002 to 2009, Syria and Turkey signed nearly 50 
cooperation agreements and conducted their first-ever joint military 
exercises. In 2010 Syria and Turkey signed a counter-terrorism 
agreement for a more effective campaign against the Kurdish Worker‘s 
Party (PKK) and Turkey became Syria‘s largest trading partner. In 2011 
the two countries along with Jordan and Lebanon signed the ShamGen 
agreement for a joint visa that enabled citizens of Turkey, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria to travel to any of these countries. The same dramatic 
increase has also been witnessed in Turkey and Iran relations. It has 
improved considerably economically and politically. It was at this time 
period that Turkey‘s relations with Israel were in transition ―from 
hyperactivity to normal ties.‖ Unlike the mid-1990s, Ankara opted to 
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play a low-key profile in its relations with Israel beginning in 2002. This 
has also contributed to the developments of Turkey‘s relations with Iran 
rapidly in economic and political arena. 
Turkey‘s relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States and 
Palestine have also improved. Turkey‘s refusing to allow the deployment 
of American troops created an environment in the Middle East in which 
Turkey was perceived as having returned to its roots – the Middle East. 
Turkey has developed its relations with the regional organizations, 
namely Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab League and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Turkish candidate for OIC Secretary-General 
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu won the election at the 2005 meeting in Istanbul. 
In 2006, Turkey was invited to the Arab League meetings as a 
―permanent guest.‖ The developing relations with the Middle East 
became even clearer when the OIC invited Turkic Republic of Northern 
Cyprus as the Turkish Cyprus State to its meetings. 
During the AKP period Turkey has diversified its foreign 
relations – not only with the Middle East, but also with Asia and Africa 
(Ozkan, 2011, 115-113; Ozkan and Akgun, 2010, 525-546). Stressing 
that none of the relations is seen as an alternative to another, Turkey is 
keen on playing a key role in its immediate region and further afield. 
Assuming the co-chairmanship of Alliance of Civilizations with Spain by 
the request of the UN Secretary-General in order to develop civilizational 
harmony, instead of clash, is an indication that Turkey could even 
represent or speak on behalf of the Middle East in particular, and Islamic 
world at large. It is easy to identify this wave as being more sophisticated 
and diversified in comparison to previous ones. Economic, social and 
cultural relations have intensified and have had a greater impact. In 
contrast to previous waves, the AKP has added more social and economic 
dimensions that indicate a different period in Turkey‘s relations with the 
Middle East. 
  Ankara‘s new diplomacy has also changed the Arab perception on 
Turkey. In the past, Turkey‘s image in the Arab world was characterized 
by its militant secularism, obsessive Westernization, and rejection of its 
Islamic-Ottoman heritage under the heavy weight of Kemalism. Since the 
AKP came to power in late 2002, Turkey began moving in a different 
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direction, namely pro-Islamic, that it was slowly coming to terms with its 
Muslim identity. It was also modifying its foreign policy along a more 
strategic and multidimensional line. The AKP‘s foreign policy has been 
based on what Prime Minister Erdogan‘s top foreign policy advisor and 
now foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu (2001), calls ―strategic depth‖ 
and ―zero-problems‖ with neighbors. Davutoglu‘s main argument is that 
Turkey is a great power that has neglected its historic ties and diplomatic, 
economic, and political relations with the Middle East, North Africa, the 
Balkans, and Eurasia, dating back to the Ottoman era. Since Turkey‘s 
new-found self-confidence and activism is mostly visible in formerly 
Ottoman territories, the AKP‘s foreign policy is sometimes called as 
―neo-Ottomanism‖ (Taspinar, 2008).  
Turkey managed to improve its relations with all of its neighbors 
and advocated political integration as well as free flow of goods and 
services in its neighborhood. This policy achieved concrete results in the 
form of increased and diversified economic relations, heightened 
diplomacy and political influence. It led closer coordination with 
neighbors on issues such as terrorism, mediation in international 
conflicts, and received a broadly positive response to Turkish foreign 
policy. In implementing its neighborhood policy, Turkey advocated 
speaking to all sides, including groups such as the Palestinian movement 
Hamas. Seen as an honest broker, Turkey mediated between Israel and 
Syria in 2008, as well as between Iran and the international community in 
the nuclear issue in 2010 (Kosebalaban, 2010, 36-50; Ozkan, 2011, 26-
30). Turkey‘s diplomatic initiatives were never guaranteed success; but 
the new Turkish foreign policy was no longer a spectator to regional 
developments but a serious actor shaping and contributing to various 
difficult issues. 
 
The Arab Revolutions and Turkish Diplomacy: Toward a New 
Regional Order 
Before the Arab Spring, according to Kalin (2011) Turkey has 
developed different types of relationships with the countries of the 
Middle East, targeting improved relations with both governments and the 
public. Indeed, Turkey is probably the only country that has been able to 
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promote relations at the two levels in the Arab world without facing too 
many difficulties. In that sense, one can argue that Turkey's policy of 
engaging different governments and political groups in the Arab world 
has contributed to transform the Middle Eastern politics. Turkish officials 
have stated on various occasions that change in the Arab world is 
inevitable and must reflect people's legitimate demands for justice, 
freedom, and prosperity. Moreover, change must occur without violence, 
and a peaceful transition to a pluralist democracy should be ensured. It 
was in this context that Turkish diplomacy has responded to the Arab 
revolutions.  
 
Tunisia and Egypt: Risky, Difficult, but Clear-Cut 
Since the beginning of demonstrations in Tunisia in December 
2010, Turkey has followed closely the developments in the region to 
respond correctly and, if possible, guide indirectly towards a right 
direction that paves the way democratic regimes flourish. When Tunisian 
Revolution was taking place, Turkey kept a low profile as many states 
did in the world but indicated that it is ready to help in transformation 
and voiced that Tunisian leaders should listen to the voice of their people. 
However, Turkey was forthright in its support for democracy when the 
revolution spirit reached Cairo‘s Tahrir Square. Prime Minister Erdogan 
was the first leader to call for Hosni Mubarak‘s resignation in a televised 
speech on Al-Jazeera in February 2011, and President Abdullah Gul was 
the first head of state to meet with the Egyptian Supreme Council in 
Egypt after the revolution. 
When demonstrations broke out in Egypt, Turkey took a very 
risky position by asking Hosni Mubarak to leave. Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan in a statement to Turkish Parliament made an emotional 
appeal to the Egyptian leader, saying ―We are all mortal and we must 
listen to our people.‖ He advised Mubarak to respond to the Egyptian 
people's demands to change the political regime. And he urged him to 
step down and establish an interim authority that would drive the country 
to a "genuine democratic" change. Naturally, Erdogan‘s call was not 
received well by the Arab leaders in general and Egyptian leadership in 
particular. Egypt‘s then Foreign Minister Ahmad Abul Gheit in a letter to 
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his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu expressed dismay at Erdogan's 
advisory and termed it as interference in Egypt's internal affairs: ―His 
(Turkish Premier‘s) remarks could aggravate our domestic situation.‖ 
The letter raised the prospects of Egypt-Turkey relations coming under 
strain but there was not only relief  but Ankara also felt vindicated when 
President Mubarak stepped down on 12 February 2011. 
According to Kardas (2011) Erdogan‘s advice was considered, 
and somewhat unexpected, by many as a very strong statement given the 
fact that promotion of democracy has never been a part of Turkey‘s 
official discourse, because it has its own problems such as the Kurdish 
issue that undermine its democracy. But Turkey has made significant 
strides in terms of democratization since 2002. Therefore, it will be fair 
to interpret Erdogan‘s appeal to Mubarak as part of Ankara‘s increasing 
self-confidence vis-à-vis its democracy. It also signals the broad contours 
of Turkey‘s approach to global politics and ‗soft‘ promotion of 
democracy in the region – wittingly or unwittingly. Erdogan‘s call for 
Mubarak to step down was also the first European reaction to 
developments in Egypt. This was acknowledged and appreciated by the 
West and also by the people in the Arab world. For example, former 
prime minister of Belgium and current Liberal Group Chairman in the 
European Parliament Guy Verhofstadt put the appreciation on record 
when he said ―Erdogan is the only one who told Mubarak that democracy 
meant change and that it is now time for Mubarak to go‖. Some 
commentators even claimed that Erdogan has taught a democracy lesson 
to Europe. 
Turkey showed an outmost interest in developing relations with 
Egypt after the revolution. Erdogan and Davutoglu visited Cairo various 
times and the new President of Egypt Mohammed Mursi paid one of his 
first visits to Turkey. Considering this, Turkey is openly seeking to build 
a regional partnership with Egypt, with the goal of establishing a new 
axis of power in the Middle East in the midst of the power vacuum 
created by the Arab Spring and as the US influence in the region is 
waning. In an interview with the New York Times published on 19 
September 2011, Foreign Minister Davutoglu (2011) said: ―this will not 
be an axis against any other country — not Israel, not Iran, not any other 
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country, but this will be an axis of democracy, real democracy […] of the 
two biggest nations in our region, from the north to the south, from the 
Black Sea down to the Nile Valley in Sudan.‖ The proposed partnership 
is to be grounded mostly in economic cooperation at least for now – with 
an increasingly political outlook. In September 2011, a delegation of 
Egyptian businessmen visited Turkey. Davutoglu predicted that trade 
between the two would grow from its current $3.5 billion to $5 billion in 
two years. He also downplays accusations that an alliance might 
engender rivalry: ―some people may think Egypt and Turkey are 
competing. No. This is our strategic decision. We want a strong Egypt.‖ 
Perhaps, as a sign of this, in November 2012, Erdogan visited Egypt with 
ten ministers and a huge delegation. Both countries did not only sign 27 
agreements, but also have established High Level Consultation 
Mechanism to deepen these relations. 
 
Libya: Diplomacy behind Zigzags and Reality 
The developments in Libya have placed Turkey in a piquant 
situation. More than 25 thousand people from Turkey were living and 
many Turkish companies were operating especially in construction field 
in all over the Libya. Understandably therefore, Turkey did not take a 
strong position against the Libyan leader initially, while it was busy 
evacuating its citizens from the troubled country. Ankara has advised the 
Libyan leaders not to use state power against the opposition. In a manner 
of speaking, Turkish position was in sync with the international 
community – from China to India and the US, which, in the initial stages, 
was trying to understand what was going on in the ground.  
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey did not extend full support to 
the Libyan opposition until early August 2011 and did not acknowledge 
the opposition as legitimate representatives. In Libya, Turkey was also 
initially opposed to NATO‘s intervention to enforce a no-fly zone, and 
had participated exclusively in the humanitarian dimension of the 
intervention. Turkey also pursued diplomatic efforts to propose a 
negotiated ceasefire between Muammar Gaddafi and the revolutionaries. 
When this failed, Turkey‘s Prime Minister Erdogan urged Gaddafi to quit 
and leave the country on May 3, 2011, approximately three months after 
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protests began in Libya. There were various reasons for Turkey‘s initial 
position on Libya; Turkey‘s good business relations with Muammar 
Qaddafi‘s regime before the revolts could be cited as one reason for 
Turkey‘s cautious approach to the revolt. Turkish construction companies 
had secured lucrative contracts in Libya worth $23 billion and more 
contracts were to be signed. But it would be unfair to assume that 
Turkey‘s sole purpose was to gain financial benefit. Turkey realized the 
possible danger in the Western agenda that wanted to hijack a popular 
uprising and use it as a pretext to plunder the vast oil resources of Libya. 
However, the fact that Turkey confronted by a strong international liberal 
interventionist discourse, it had some difficulty in explaining itself 
cogently in its attempt to defend the Libyan people and their interests 
(Yilmaz, 2011).  
 After failing to prevent foreign intervention in Libya, Turkey 
reversed its position and joined the NATO intervention in order to be 
influential at decision-making process of the intervention and sided fully 
with the opposition in Libya. Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited three 
times Bingazhi to foster relations with the opposition and help them in 
transitional period. Erdogan also visited Libya in September 2010 to 
show his support and sympathy for the revolution and democracy. 
Currently, Turkey-Libya relations are very good both at social and state 
level; and it is likely to develop further in future.  
 
Syria: The Biggest and Ongoing Challenge 
Comparing to other revolutions, Syria has been the most 
complicated and delicate one for Turkish foreign policy, because, Turkey 
was forced to offer a concrete solution, as the crisis was much closer to 
home in many ways. According to Yilmaz (2011) Turkey had to consider 
the crisis in Syria in the context of its close economic relationship with 
Syria, Sunni-Alawite tensions, democratization, regional balance, and 
also more urgently the Kurdish question. When the demonstrations broke 
out in Dera‘a, which soon turned into an armed struggle against the 
Ba‗ath regime, Turkey was initially cautious. On 25 May 2011, 
Davutoglu said that the Syrian President Bashar Asad must win back the 
hearts of his people through reform, despite the fact that the increasingly-
M. Ozkan & H. Korkut                                Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2013) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
[174] 
coordinated opposition groups openly rejected negotiation with a regime 
willing to shoot civilians. Turkish officials recommended a national anti-
corruption campaign and reform of Syria‘s feared state security and 
intelligence services. They also urged Asad to undertake a national 
dialogue inclusive of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which has been 
brutally suppressed for years. Therefore, Ankara‘s criticism of Syria was 
measured and continued to support Asad at the initial stages.  
Turkey had several reasons for supporting Asad. First, Syria has 
taken steps to improve people‘s freedoms after Bashar Asad inherited the 
Ba‗ath party leadership. He eased political restrictions and introduced a 
number of economic reforms to improve the country‘s economy which in 
return secured him the support of the wealthy Sunni class despite his 
Alawi background. And he slowly but positively responded to the reform 
calls. Although protesters regularly come out in the streets of some cities 
to express dissatisfaction with the ruling Ba‗th regime which has 
instituted repressive policies and restricted democracy and freedom of the 
people, a friendly Turkey would be better placed to negotiate between the 
opposition and the regime to find alternative solutions. Second, Turkey 
has huge trade interests in Syria as Ankara has become the largest trading 
partner of Syria. Third is their cooperation against the PKK. Syria hosts a 
significant proportion of the Kurdish population, some of whom have 
joined the PKK. Turkish policy makers realize that if Syria is destabilized 
and turns into another Iraq, it might also become a breeding ground for 
PKK recruitment. And of course if the violence escalates, a larger refugee 
influx will hit the Turkish economy. 
Considering above-mentioned reasons, Turkey tried to contain the 
situation in Syria through dialogue. Soon after protests broke out, Turkey 
sent Hakan Fidan, Head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) 
to Damascus twice and on  April 7, 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu visited Damascus to pressure Asad for reforms. Asad did 
introduce some reforms but Ankara was not satisfied and expressed anger 
at the violent crackdown against the opposition. Turkish policy makers 
realized that the situation was getting worse and they had to make a 
decision in the face of increasing pressure from the US and Saudi Arabia. 
M. Ozkan & H. Korkut                                Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2013) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
[175] 
The first signal about Turkey‘s changing policy came from 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu. He conveyed a message to Asad‘s special 
envoy in Turkey that Ankara‘s support ―hinges on the willingness of the 
Syrian government to adopt sweeping reforms in the country.‖ In the 
meantime, despite the Syrian government‘s strong displeasure, Turkey 
hosted a conference in Antalya for Syrian opposition groups between 31 
May 2011 and 3 June 2011 with the tacit approval of the Turkish foreign 
ministry. The delegates who participated in the conference made it clear 
that they were not interested in negotiations, and that their aim was to 
topple the regime. And finally, in an interview on Turkish television on 
10 June 2011, Erdogan openly distanced himself from Bashar Asad: ―I 
tell you clearly that his brother, Mahir al-Asad, the Head of the 
Republican Guard, reacts in an inhumane way that can only end in 
massacre. This concerns the UN Security Council which is already 
coming to the same conclusion. After all this, Turkey cannot defend 
Syria.‖ On 16 June 2011, another conference was organized by the Syrian 
opposition in Istanbul, entitled the National Independence Conference. 
There were some 350 delegates from various opposition groups that 
formed a shadow cabinet in preparation to take over from the Ba‘ath 
regime run by the Asad family. 
Following a clear change from supporting Asad to a total 
disengagement from the current regime in Syria, Turkey's Syria policy 
focused more on a continuation of its long-standing goal of trying to 
prevent civil war and sectarian conflicts, while preserving its neutral but 
constructive position (Yilmaz and Ustun, 2011). But as the developments 
on the ground evolved, Ankara took a strong anti-Asad position and 
openly declared that he should be removed. Grounded in this thinking, 
Turkey now acts with international community and the Arab League in 
its endeavor to bring stability and peace to Syria and stop killings. In 
coordination with the Arab League, Turkey has announced sanctions for 
Syria on 30 November 2011. These include a ban on transactions with 
Syria's government and central bank and measures against prominent 
businessmen who support the regime. However, Turkey has announced 
that it will not implement sanctions that directly influence the lives of the 
Syrian people such as cutting electricity, water and trade. During the time 
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of writing this article, Syrian issue is still at the center of international 
and regional attention. What will happen in Syria has direct regional and 
global repercussions, because it will shape the regional balances and 
order. Turkey is likely to follow closely the developments in Syria and 
try to play a constructive role in finding a solution. Eventually, 
developments in Syria are likely to impact on Turkey more directly than 
other actors. 
 
Turkish Diplomacy and Debate on “Turkish Model” 
As mentioned in the first section, before and soon after the Arab 
Spring began, Turkey‘s popularity had been on the rise in the Arab 
world. Since the AKP were first elected in 2002, Turkey with its 
flourishing democracy and rapidly growing economic and military might 
has become an emerging regional power. This has already created an 
interest in Turkey from the Middle East. However, it can be argued that 
Turkey‘s foreign policy activism in the Middle East has contributed to 
the downfall of authoritarian regimes, by implicitly calling for the end of 
the ―Camp David order‖ and exposing repressive regimes that survived 
with the help of regional strategic arrangements related to the conflict 
with Israel (Ozhan, 2011, 58-59). Turkey showed that it is possible to be 
democratic, have good relations with the West, and still stand up to 
unjust Israeli policies. Its ―dignified‖ stance was strengthened after the 
incident at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in 2009 in 
which Erdogan stormed out of a discussion with Israeli President Shimon 
Peres about Israel‘s war in Gaza. Erdogan‘s gesture, widely acclaimed on 
the Arab street, exposed and undermined Arab leaders who had 
acquiesced to Israeli policies and committed to the status quo. Turkey‘s 
stance has had a significant political impact across the Arab world. 
The fact that Turkey has succeeded in staging a soft revolution 
against the once powerful autocracy at home has been very important in 
Arab view of Turkey. Economic and political achievements made Turkey 
a good candidate as a ―role model‖ to replace the despotic Arab regimes. 
At the time, members of strong opposition groups such as the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Islamic movement Hizb al-
Nahdah, as well as the masses, did not hide their sympathy for the 
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Turkish model. Indeed, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
captured the moment by extending his strong support to Egyptian and 
Tunisian revolutionaries, warning Arabian leaders that they should 
swiftly implement reforms and meet the democratic demands of their 
people. 
It is interesting to note here that Turkey has never presented itself 
as a model to the Arab world. Mostly the Arab media, civil society and 
opposition groups in the Arab world have presented Turkey as a model to 
the Arab world. This has intensified once these actors have become a key 
player in the new Middle East after the revolutions. Nevertheless, the 
debate on ―Turkish Model‖ is not limited to newly emerging actors in the 
Arab world, but also has been discussed and promoted by the West. For 
example, Britain's former Prime Minister Tony Blair said that democratic 
Turkey is a role model for Arab Spring countries. The Western interest in 
the Turkish model seems to be particularly driven by satisfaction with the 
fact that Turkey has been able to achieve a true and lasting reconciliation 
between Islam and democracy, on one hand, and between Islam and the 
West, on the other. It has also managed to realistically address the 
problems of minorities and religious freedom. The West seems 
enthusiastic about this model and hopes it can be seen as a model by the 
Arab revolutionaries seeking to establish democracy. 
Nevertheless, it is our contention that Turkish model should be 
analyzed beyond the classical approaches. The most important 
―modelhood‖, if there is one, is related to the way Ankara positions itself 
in global politics and approaches issues. For example, Egyptian political 
scientist Hassan Nafaa (2011) argues that ―Turkey‘s foreign policy 
obviously provides Egypt with a model of how a country can, despite 
being allied with the West, adopt an independent policy consistent with 
its national interests. This has been one of the most important lessons 
learned in the Arab world thus far from the Turkish model‖ (p. 44). 
Undoubtedly, changes in the Middle East opened a debate whether 
Turkey could be a model for newly emerging regimes. As mentioned, 
there is an immense interest whether or not Turkey is a model. 
Conceptually speaking, Islamists, the West and Arab streets see merit in 
the Turkish model for a variety of different reasons. Islamists see the 
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example of AKP as a way of coming to power through elections, while 
the West sees Turkey as a successful mix of Islam and democracy, 
modernization and secularism. For the people in the Arab streets Turkey 
is a model of economic development, dignity, job creation, public service 
and welfare (Duran and Yilmaz, 2011). Whatever are the reasons for 
proposing Turkey as a model, the fact remains that Turkey is an 
inspiration in building the new Arab world. So, it is obvious that in the 
days ahead importance of Turkey will increase in the region. Diversity of 
perspectives on Turkey also indicates the multiple facets of Turkish 
model, and it is a real indication of Turkey‘s own complexity both at 
domestic and international levels.  
Despite its conservative roots, even after more than 10 years in 
office, the AKP continues to appeal to a much wider electorate including 
more secular middle class elements in the Turkish society and this is 
what makes it an attractive case study. Perhaps, that is why the 
importance and success of the AKP has also implications beyond the 
Middle East. In almost every third world countries and in the Muslim 
world in particular, there exists a center who dominates the power and a 
periphery that actually deprived of power and decision-making. For 
example in the Middle East, there is a distinctive division between the 
ruling elite and the public. What is striking is that due to lack of 
democracy and mostly the power transfer being held between family 
members, the excluded majorities has no way to channel their voices to 
the top. So far, the AKP has been the only successful experience in the 
Middle East that brought the periphery to the center without alienating or 
clashing directly with the center. This itself represent a major 
breakthrough given the existing literature‘s emphasis that Islam and 
democracy is incompatible. The AKP example shows that both can co-
exist peacefully with an increasing legitimacy from the public (Cevik, 
2011, 121-144). In that sense, the AKP can be seen as a model in a way 
that it has consolidated Turkey‘s historical domestic divide between 
center and periphery. 
Considering that each society has different historical, institutional 
and structural settings in its political arena, the AKP experience in 
Turkey cannot be copied, but can be taken as an inspiring model in the 
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third world in general and the Middle East in particular. As the leaders 
behind AKP experience made explicit as early as in 2003 and later years 
frequently, Turkey does not want to be a model to any country, but 
drawing lessons and being ―a source of inspiration‖ in ―finding their own 
solutions to their own problems‖ are as normal as historical events.   
 
Conclusion 
Arab revolutions have not ended yet and it will take time to settle 
their transition. Revolutions are still in process, most importantly in 
Syria. Turkish diplomacy and foreign policy will also evolve and 
transform itself as the time goes. What will underline Turkish approach 
to developments are stability, transition from within and regional 
ownership for revolutions. However, Turkey‘s outmost interest will be to 
define a new regional order based on regional sensitivities and interests. 
In that sense, the success or the failure of revolutions will also directly 
influence Turkish policy toward the region.  
Needless to say, the Arab revolutions have presented the Middle 
East with a historic opportunity for a more democratic and dignified 
future. While the transition in Libya and Tunisia are important, Egypt‘s 
evolution into a stable democracy will be crucial for the structural 
transformation of the region. If the new Egypt seizes this opportunity 
without reverting to a pseudo-democracy for piecemeal strategic 
arrangements, the prospect of the emergence of a new regional order that 
Turkey wants may turn into reality. The greatest challenge for Turkey 
during this period is to help create the new language and terms of 
discourse. Turkey must not watch but manage this process whenever it 
can, as it did during the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. If Turkey 
can remain involved and relevant in the medium term, then it may help 
the Arab momentum to create a truly new regional order. 
 
M. Ozkan & H. Korkut                                Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2013) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
[180] 
References 
Altunisik, M. B. (2004). "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a 
New Beginning?" In Idris Bal (ed), Turkish Foreign Policy in 
Post Cold War Era. Florida: Brown Walker Press.  
Ataman, M. (2002). ―Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and 
Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy.‖ Alternatives: Turkish 
Journal of International Relations, 1, (1).  
Cevik, S. (2011). ―Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the 
Middle East.‖ Estudios Politicos, 38.  
Davutoglu, A. (2001). Stratejik Derinlik. Istanbul: Kure.   
Davutoglu, A. (2008). ―Turkey‘s New Foreign Policy Vision.‖ Insight 
Turkey, 10, (1).  
Duran B. and Yilmaz, N. (2011). ―Whose Model? Which Turkey?‖ 
Foreign Policy Online. 
Efegil, E. 2001). "Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey: A Legal 
Perspective." Turkish Studies, 2, (1).  
Hale, W. (1992). "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis." 
International Affairs, 68, (4).   
Kalin, I. (2011). ―Turkey and the Arab Spring.‖ Al Jazeera Opinion. 
Kardas, S. (2011). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Coming to Terms 
with Democracy Promotion? The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States (GMF) Policy Brief. 
Karaosmanoglu, A. L. (2000). ―The Evolution of the National Security 
Culture and the Military in Turkey.‖ Journal of International 
Affairs, 54, (1).  
Kosebalaban, H. (2010). ―The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is 
its Strategic Significance?‖ Middle East Policy, 17, (3).   
Makovsky, A. (1999). "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy." 
SAIS Review. 
Nafaa, H. (2011). ―The ―Turkish Model‖ In the Mirror of the Arab 
Spring‖, in Turkey and The Arab Spring: Implications For 
Turkish Foreign Policy From A Transatlantic Perspective, 
Mediterranean Paper Series, Washington, DC.: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States. 
M. Ozkan & H. Korkut                                Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2013) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
[181] 
Ozkan, M. and Akgun, B. (2010). ―Turkey‘s Opening to Africa.‖ The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 48, (4). 
Ozkan, M. (2006). ―Turkish Activism in the Middle East after 1990s: 
Towards a Periodization of Three Waves." Turkish Review of 
Middle East Studies, 17. 
Ozkan, M. (2011). ―El Oriente Medio en la política mundial: un enfoque 
sistémico.‖ Estudios Politicos, 38. 
Ozkan, M. (2011). "Turkey‘s ‗New‘ Engagements in Africa and Asia: 
Scope, Content and Implications." Perceptions: Journal of 
International Affairs, XVI, (3).    
Ozkan, M. (2011). ―Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: 
What Is the Big Deal?‖ Strategic Analysis, 35, (1).  
Ozhan, T. (2011). ―The Arab Spring and Turkey: The Camp David Order 
vs. the New Middle East.‖ Insight Turkey, l13, (4).  
Quinn, M. R. (2004). ―From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: the 
Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey.‖ Third World 
Quarterly, 25, (2).  
Robins, P. (1992). "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis, Adventurist or 
Dynamic?" In Clement H. Dodd (ed.) Turkish Foreign Policy, 
New Prospects, Modern Turkish Studies Programme, Occasional 
Paper 2, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. 
Sayari, S. (1992). "Turkey: The Changing European Security 
Environment and the Gulf Crisis." Middle East Journal, 46, (1). 
Taspinar, O. (2008). Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-
Ottomanism and Kemalism, Carneige Paper 10.   
Yilmaz, N. (2011). ―New Turkey and the Arab Spring?‖ Open 
Democracy.  
Yilmaz N. and Ustun, K. (2011). ―Turkey's policy towards Syria is a 
success.― Al Jazeera Opinion. 
 
